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  Realists believe that the distribution of power among states dictates international 
relationships. In a situation where there is a dispute between an apparently stronger and 
an apparently weaker state, the stronger state would be expected to use its power, 
including its military power, to achieve its objective. Yet, this often does not happen. For 
example, China’s navy is far superior to Vietnam’s, Laos’, and Cambodia’s navies. 
However, China has yet to use force with its military assets to acquire total access to the 
South China Sea. This paper will investigate why this frequently occurs. Why is this the 
case? 
 Four theories may answer this question: 1) perceived reputational costs to a state 
may deter the use of force, 2) strategic culture may influence a state to hesitate using 
force outside of its borders, 3) an extensive alliance network will deter an attack from a 
stronger state, and 4) a history of tenacity and resistance may deter the stronger state from 
using force. This paper uses four different case studies to test these theories: the Corfu 
Channel dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania, the Sino-Vietnamese 
territorial dispute, the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the 
cross-straight dispute between China and Taiwan. 
 This research paper found that theory 1 best explains why a stronger state may not 
attack a weaker state from the case studies. The other three theories were found to be 
inconclusive. This research paper serves as an introduction to further investigate 
asymmetric power relationships between two states. 
Research Advisor: Dr. Mark Stout 




Table of Contents 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….…….. ii 
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………... iii	
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 1 
 Issues in Context…………………………………………………………………. 2 
 
Literature Review………………………………………………………………………… 3 
 Theory 1……………………………………………………………………...........3 
 Theory 2………………………………………………………………………….. 5 
 Theory 3………………………………………………………………………….. 5 





 Corfu Channel Background Information……………………………………….. 10 
 Corfu Channel Analysis……………………………………………………….... 12 
 Sino-Vietnamese Territory Dispute Background Information…………………. 15 
 Sino-Vietnamese Territory Dispute Analysis……………………………….….. 16 
 Beagle Channel Conflict Background Information…………………………….. 19 
 Beagle Channel Conflict Analysis……………………………………………… 21 
 Cross-Straight Dispute Background Information………………………………. 23 















 Realists believe that the distribution of power among states dictates international 
relationships. In a situation where there is a dispute between an apparently stronger and 
an apparently weaker state, the stronger state would be expected to use its power, 
including its military power, to achieve its objective. Yet, this often does not happen. For 
example, China’s navy is far superior to Vietnam’s, Laos’, and Cambodia’s navies. 
However, China has yet to use force with its military assets to acquire total access to the 
South China Sea. This paper will investigate why this frequently occurs.  
 Although the term is commonly used in the field of international relations, 
“power” has a variety of definitions. One way is to define power in terms of its effects. 
Robert A. Dahl defines it simply as the ability of a state to get another state “to do 
something [it] would otherwise not do.”1 Similarly, Viotti and Kauppi define power as 
“the means by which a state or another actor wields or can assert actual or potential 
influence or coercion relative to other states and non-state actors because of the political, 
geographic, economic and financial, technological, military, social, cultural, or other 
capabilities it possesses.”2  
 Another approach is to define power in terms of its inputs. Dorel Buse asserts that 
what power composes on depends on the context of the situation; at times, a state’s power 
draws on one vector, while power in other scenarios is the sum of multiple vectors.3 
Although categories of power subcomponents are not universally agreed upon, Buse 
																																																								
1 Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” pp 202-203.  
2 Viotti and Kauppi, “International Relations Theory,” 202.  
3 Buse, “The Concept of Power in International Relations,” 5. 
 
	 2	
asserts that the main subcomponents consist of: military capability, economic capability, 
and technological/information capability.4  
 “Military power” is quite often defined with regard to its inputs. For instance, 
Veljko Blagojevic defines military power as the elements related to the threat of using 
force, such as the quantity and quality of weapons, the ability to effectively command 
units, and the overall morale of the organization.5 He argues that military power is one of 
two components of military capability; military force is the other component of 
capability. Military force refers to the representation of an organization equipped and 
trained to utilize its assets; force symbolizes intimidation and destruction.6 The 
combination of military force and power thus creates military capability, which is the 
“ability to successfully prosecute a variety of a variety of operations against a country’s 
adversaries.”7  
 
Issue in Context 
 Blagojevic argues that “overwhelming military power provides a greater 
likelihood for potential opponents to persuade, dissuade, or be forced to postpone action 
that would harm national interests.”8 In other words, he argues that opponents with 
greater military power are more likely to use it in order to achieve its objectives. With 
this in mind, it would make sense that, in a confrontation, a militarily superior state 
would utilize its power advantage to get another state to do something they would not 
																																																								
4 Buse, “The Concept of Power in International Relations,” 6. 
5 Blagojevic, “Military Power in US Foreign Policy – Tradition and Challenges,” 1142.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 1143.  
8 Ibid., 1142.  
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normally do. Yet, many stronger states decide to not apply its military power against 
apparently weaker states in order to obtain its objectives. Why is this?  
 Four theories potentially explain this phenomenon: 1) stronger states may be 
deterred from the use of military power by the perceived cost to its reputation, 2) strategic 
culture influences the likelihood of using of military power, 3) more powerful states may 
be deterred from attacking less powerful states that have extensive alliance networks, and 
4) more powerful states may be deterred from attacking less powerful states that have 
reputations for tenacity in defense, such as through guerilla resistance. 
 Through these four theories, this research paper will address the limitations of 
power in an attempt to answer why stronger states may decide to not utilize its superior 
military power against weaker states when the two are locked in a dispute.  
 
Literature Review 
 There are many reasons to why states use force against another state. However, 
when there is an apparently stronger state and an apparently weaker state, the stronger 
state may choose to not use force. Existing scholarship may highlight four potential 
theories explaining why this is the case. 
  
Theory 1: Perceived reputation costs deter the use of military power. 
 One body of literature suggests that when tensions rise between two states with an 
apparent imbalance of power, the willingness of the apparently stronger power to utilize 
military power to coerce the other is influenced by its sensitivity to its international 
reputation. John Meyers, for instance, asserts that, regardless of the stance on how 
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significant international reputation is to the state, diplomats and state leaders will act in a 
manner that protects their own state’s reputation.9 This is known as the “cult of 
reputation,” where politicians fear the potential loss of reputation and justify their actions 
to defending their state’s reputation.10 Meyers argues that past actions will contribute to a 
state’s reputation; “standing firm in past crises can signal the strength of a state’s military 
and the importance of a particular commitment.”11 Under this assumption, state leaders 
may also (not) act when in a dispute with a weaker power to protect their reputation. For 
example, a state may eschew aggressive acts in order to avoid gaining the reputation of 
being a bully.  
 In particular, an apparently stronger state may hesitate to use force against an 
apparently weaker state because it perceived that such action would violate international 
norms or international law, and thus, damage its own reputation. International relations 
are heavily reliant on following international norms, or the “standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors within a given identity.”12 This definition of international norms is 
commonly utilized with the phrase international law due to their close relations.13 
International law is the code of guidance for states should behave.14 Effectively, breaking 
international law will ostracize one state from the rest of the international community. As 
a result, this will damage their reputation. Therefore, a state concerned with its reputation 
may decide to not exercise military power-- especially when such action breaks 
international law-- in order to protect their reputation. 
																																																								
9 Meyers, “Reputation Matters: Evidence from the Korean War,” 19. 
10 Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” 40. 
11 Meyers, “Reputation Matters: Evidence from the Korean War,” 34.  
12 Finnemore & Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change,” 891.   
13 Zartner, “Internalization of International Law.” 
14 Jensen & Miller, “Global Challenge,” 86.  
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Theory 2: The strategic culture of some states discourages them from using force outside 
its borders. 
 The decision to exercise military power is also influenced by the state’s culture. 
Scobell argues that strategic culture is a significant dimension in determining the 
likeliness of one state exercising force on another.15 Strategic culture is defined as “the 
fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war in human affairs and the 
efficacy of applying force.”16 This aligns with Paranjpe’s definition of strategic culture, 
which it refers to “a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, 
symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving 
problems with respect to the threat or use of force.”17 Strategic culture may engrave an 
affinity for aggressive behavior, or restraint in utilizing military power when dealing with 
another country. In the context of China, Scobell argues that national cultures is a key 
dimension of strategy, and past/present policies are conditioned by the pre-existing 
philosophy of international relations.18 
 
Theory 3: More powerful states may be deterred from attacking less powerful states that 
have extensive alliance networks. 
 International relations scholars disagree on whether alliances lead to peace or 
provoke war. Leeds asserts that since the term alliance “represents a heterogeneous 
category of cooperative security agreements that may have different effects on the 
																																																								
15 Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture,” 1. 
16 Ibid., 2.  
17 Ibid., 13.  
18 Ibid., 1.  
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probability of conflicts,” the debate over alliances leading to peace or war is ill-posed.19 
She argues that alliance commitments impact the likelihood of initiating a dispute, 
because “different alliances involve different promises to different actors, alliances can 
have different effects.”20 In other words, alliances can deter the decision to initiate a 
dispute, or set the conditions to provoke one. In international relations, deterrence is 
defined as “the act of influencing an adversary’s cost/benefit calculations to prevent it 
from doing something that you do not want them to do.”21 Defensive alliances are created 
to prevent violent action from another state, and therefore are successful in general 
deterrence.22 This is because through the alliance, at least one state has the obligation to 
assist its ally if threatened by a third party.23  
 Deterrence theory attracts its share of criticism; one criticism is that alliance 
network deterrence relies on the assumption that the alliance network will be exercised 
politically and strategically.24 In other words, an ally will come to the aid of an attacked 
ally. Part of the effectiveness in defense alliances is the perception it portrays to the 
aggressor. Jervis asserts, “state actors will view alliances as more unified and durable 
from outside the alliance in comparison to inside.”25 Whether or not an alliance network 
provides an apparently weaker state guaranteed military support from its allies, the 
alliance network increases the military capability by increasing the state’s military force, 
by Blagojevic’s definition, and thus increases perceived military capability. In essence, 
																																																								
19 Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of 
Militarized Interstate Disputes,” 427.  
20 Ibid., 428. 
21 Goldman, “Navigating Deterrence: Law, Strategy, and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” 311.  
22 Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of 
Militarized Interstate Disputes,” 437.  
23 Ibid, 432.  
24 Bertram, “Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance,” 290. 
25 Jervis, “Perception and Misperception in International Politics,” 326.  
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more powerful states may be deterred from attacking the less powerful state due to a 
perception of stronger military capability, and fear of retaliation from the totality of the 
alliance. 
 Another criticism of deterrence is that it is usually only possible between two 
“relatively symmetrical [states].”26 This is often studied in the United States-Soviet 
Union deterrence scenario during the Cold War, especially when comparing the NATO 
and Soviet Bloc alliance networks.27 Goldman argues, however, that deterrence research 
implies a “Fourth Wave” is emerging, where mutual deterrence is possible, and regularly 
occurring, between asymmetric powers.28 This is because contemporary scholarship 
focuses on military capability as the major factor in deterrence; only recently did military 
capabilities incorporate the cyber domain. Thus, states with cyberspace dominance may 
not be viewed as traditionally militarily dominant.29 As a result, Jervis’ argument of 
perception and misperception may further be amplified depending on the acceptance of 
the cyber domain as a military battle space. 
 
Theory 4: More powerful states may be deterred from attacking less powerful states that 
have reputations for tenacity in defense, such as through guerilla resistance. 
 The last theory involves the lack of willingness to attack an apparently weaker 
state because of its reputation for tenacity in defense. A state may be reluctant to attack 
these types of states because it is reluctant to commit to prolonged violence against that 
																																																								
26 Goldman, “Navigating Deterrence: Law, Strategy, and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” 327. 
27 Bertram, “Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance,” 295. 
28 Goldman, “Navigating Deterrence: Law, Strategy, and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” 317. 
29 Bertram, “Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance,” pp 317-318. 
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state.30 Often times, states prone to tenaciously defending themselves will require a 
longer commitment, as the dispute could evolve into a war of attrition; if the apparently 
weaker state adopts guerilla resistance as its main strategy, its operational objective is to 
wear down the stronger state’s conventional force until exhaustion.31 Guerilla armies are 
more often used in asymmetric disputes because the weaker state does not require a large 
amount of firepower nor training to be successful; their warfare becomes more political 
in winning hearts and minds of people than to seizing and holding territory.32 
Additionally, guerilla armies have the possibility of winning wars against more powerful 
adversaries because the stakes are higher for the weaker state.33 If weaker states turn the 
dispute as a political dispute, they may gain political victory in a military stalemate or 
defeat.34 Consequently, they are more willing to commit to the costs of war than the more 
powerful state to achieve its goals.35 
 
Methodology 
 This research study will use the following four disputes as case studies: 1) the 
Corfu Channel Incident between the United Kingdom and Albania, 2) the Sino-
Vietnamese conflict after 1979, 3) the Beagle Channel conflict between Argentina and 
Chile, and 4) the cross-straight dispute between China and Taiwan. These case studies 
were selected based on the following criteria: 1) each case study did not result in a war, 
																																																								
30 Allen & Fordham, “From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More 
Powerful States,” 1027. 
31 Suter, “The New Era of Warfare.” 
32 Ibid.  
33 Allen & Fordham, “From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More 
Powerful States,” 1030. 
34 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” 177.  
35 Allen & Fordham, “From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More 
Powerful States,” 1030. 
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or if the case is ongoing, there is no imminent danger of war as a result, 2) the events 
took place after World War II, and 3) there is an apparently stronger and an apparently 
weaker state involved in the dispute.  
 This research paper will determine whether the proposed theories explain the case 
study outcomes based on the historical evidence.  
 
Discussion 
 This paper will test four different case studies against the four hypotheses in why 
a stronger state may not use its military power against a weaker state to achieve its 
objective, despite being a rationally sound action. Table 1 summarizes the relationship 
between each case study and theory, while Table 2 summarizes the total number of case 
studies supporting each theory.  
 







United Kingdom and Albania Support Does Not Support Does Not Support Does Not Support 
China and Vietnam Support Support Support Support 
Argentina and Chile Does Not Support Does not Support Does Not Support Does Not Support 
China and Taiwan Support Support Support Support 
Table 1 
Summary of Relationships between Case Studies and Theories 
 
 Support Does not Support 
Theory 1 
(Reputation) 3 1 
Theory 2 
(Strategic Culture) 2 2 




(Resistance) 2 2 
Table 2 
Summary of Total Supporting Case Studies per Theory  
 
 One of the biggest limitations to this research study is the small sample size. This 
study uses only four case studies. In order to generalize the findings, the sample size 
needs to significantly increase. Additionally, some of the case studies that this research 
paper includes ongoing disputes between two countries, such as the Chinese-Taiwanese 
dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty and the Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes. Without 
closure of these conflicts, they may change in the future, shifting the findings.  
 
The Corfu Channel Incident – Background Information 
 After World War II, the United Kingdom was in the process of improving 
diplomatic relations with Albania; the two states were to send ambassadors to each other 
right.36 However, the Corfu Channel dispute occurred on May 15, 1946, when Albanian 
machine guns opened fire on Royal Navy ships occurred 1,500 meters away from 
Saranda, a coastal town in Albania.37 This further escalated on October 22, 1946, when 
two Royal Navy ships collided with mines in a considered mine-free zone, causing heavy 
damages to the two ships with 86 casualties.38 After the two Royal Navy ships collided 
with the mines, the United Kingdom initiated “Operation Retail,” where British 
minesweepers, ships, and speedboats “swept” through the contested waters for mines.39 
The dispute was territorial in nature. The United Kingdom claimed that the channel was 
																																																								
36 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 3-4. 
37 Munro, The Case of the Corfu Minefield," 870.  
38 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 7. 
39 Ibid., 8.  
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an “international highway,” and the Royal Navy initially passed through the channel 
because it was “the quickest and most convenient route from one place to another” in that 
region.40 On the other hand, Albania claimed that the United Kingdom traveled through 
waters within the Albanian territory.41  
 Ultimately, the Corfu Channel incident did not result in armed conflict. The 
United Kingdom took a diplomatic approach to the dispute. Although the United 
Kingdom was postured to use force by bombarding the coastal Albanian positions with 
artillery, disembark troops, and deploy its aviation assets, Prime Minister Attlee decided 
to “wait [first] for the [Albanian] government to respond” to the United Kingdom’s offer 
to negotiate diplomatically.42 This was because the United Kingdom still wanted to 
improve its diplomacy with Albania like beforehand. Consequently, the United Kingdom 
submitted a formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council in January 1947, 
which was later forwarded to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to examine the 
conflict.43 At the very end of the court-led investigation over the dispute, the top-secret 
document “XCU ONE,” which was official correspondence detailing military plans for 
Operation Retail, came up to light, and demonstrated that the United Kingdom were 
preemptively postured for Operation Retail to immediately respond to any Albanian 
military responses with artillery coverage.44 The ICJ ultimately found Albania liable for 
the damages from the mines on April 9, 1949, and ordered the Albanian government to 
pay reparations to the United Kingdom.45 
																																																								
40 Munro, The Case of the Corfu Minefield," 869.  
41 Ibid, 870.  
42 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 4.  
43 Ibid, 10.  
44 Ibid., 13.  
45 Ibid., 1-15. 
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The Corfu Channel Incident – Analysis 
 In the Corfu Channel Incident, the United Kingdom is the apparently stronger 
state(s), while Albania is the apparently weaker state. In light of theory 1, the United 
Kingdom would have decided to not attack Albania due to the impact it would have on its 
reputation. This is a plausible explanation for the Corfu Channel incident, evidenced by 
the United Kingdom’s decision to utilize the United Nations Security Council and the ICJ 
as a mediator in its dispute with Albania. The United Kingdom was one of the founding 
members in 1945.46 If the United Kingdom used military power rather than diplomatic 
means to resolve the Corfu Channel Incident, it would hurt its reputation as a pioneer of 
global peace. It would also undermine the United Nations as an organization, since a 
founding member decided not to use its services for such a dispute. As a permanent 
member of the Security Council, the United Nations is supposed to mandate use of force 
during conflict situations; if the United Kingdom used military force instead of 
attempting to resolve the conflict diplomatically, they would be performing an act of 
hypocrisy. In essence, there is evidence that theory 1 holds up in the Corfu Channel 
Incident, and the United Kingdom did not use military power to resolve the dispute to 
protect its reputation internationally and within the United Nations. 
 Theory 2 would suggest that the United Kingdom did not attack Albania due to its 
strategic culture. There is insufficient evidence that suggests if theory 2 holds up in this 
event. At the time of the incident, the United Kingdom was going through a shift in 
strategic culture. They were in the middle of balancing its Atlanticism and Europeanism 
																																																								
46 “Member States,” United Nations, 2020.   
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priorities, as well as redefining the purpose of the military.47 Since the 
reconceptualization of its strategic culture was ongoing at the time, its contribution to 
forming the United Nations suggests that the United Kingdom started its shift to 
improving its diplomatic relationships. Under this light, the United Kingdom could 
arguably have decided not to attack Albania because they were hesitant in defying its 
peacekeeping culture. The counter-argument could question exactly where the United 
Kingdom was at in its strategic culture shift. Although Operation Retail did not result in 
an outbreak of war, it could be argued as a direct military response to the conflict rather 
than a diplomatic meeting. Additionally, the later-discovered top-secret document “XCU 
ONE” demonstrated that the United Kingdom was to use force against Albania.48 
Ultimately, there is no conclusive evidence to support theory 2. 
 Theory 3 suggests the United Kingdom would not attack Albania because of the 
latter’s extensive alliance network. There is also no concrete evidence supporting this 
claim. Shortly after World War II, the Communist party in Albania took over- the closest 
ally Albania had was Yugoslavia.49 While the Cominform and the Warsaw Pact had yet 
to be formed until the following years, the diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and 
many of the Eastern European states (to include Yugoslavia and Albania) were in the 
midst of forming at the time of the Corfu Channel Incident.50 The Soviet-Albanian 
relationship was apparently strong; the Soviet Union maintained that “the military-
political successes of the Albanian people would have been impossible without the 
decisive aid given them by the National Liberation Army of [Yugoslavia]… and the 
																																																								
47 Miskimmons, A., “Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the 
Blair Government,” 274.  
48 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 13.  
49 Dedijer, “Albania, Soviet Pawn,” 107.  
50 Ibid, 107-109.  
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heroic Soviet Army.”51 Additionally, the Western states acknowledged that Albania was 
undergoing a rapid “Sovietization” following plenipotentiary minister Chuvakhin’s 
arrival in 1946.52 This is later exemplified with Albania’s admission to the Warsaw Pact 
in 1955.53 Thus, while it is possible that the United Kingdom did not use military force 
with Albania because of its alliance network, the United Kingdom never outright showed 
hesitation over this alliance given its military posture during Operation Retail.  
 Finally, theory 4 suggests that the United Kingdom did not attack Albania over 
the Corfu Channel Incident because of Albania’s reputation for tenacious defense. While 
the theory is appealing, there is still a lack of evidence. During World War II, there were 
many Albanian resistance groups utilizing guerrilla warfare tactics against the occupying 
Italian presence.54 Between 1943-1944, Albania experienced a civil war between the 
partisans and non-Communists.55 By 1944, Enver Hoxa, one of the leaders of the partisan 
groups, seized most of Albania, and established political dominance as premier after 
holding an unopposed Communist-held election.56 Clearly, for the five years prior to the 
Corfu Channel case, Albania repeatedly engaged in armed conflict, often utilizing 
guerrilla tactics, to pursue and defend a political agenda. Yet, the United Kingdom was 
planning to use force with its entire force from the British Mediterranean Command, 
employing artillery, aviation, and ground troop assets.57 Thus, while speculation suggests 
that theory 4 could explain the Corfu Channel Incident, there is no strong evidence of it. 
 
																																																								
51 Dedijer, “Albania, Soviet Pawn,” 10. 
52 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 2.  
53 “The Warsaw Pact,” Feb 2020.  
54 “Albania,” 2020.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Lalaj, “Burning Secrets of the Corfu Channel Incident,” 4. 
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The Sino-Vietnamese Territory Dispute – Background Information 
 This case study will examine the Sino-Vietnamese dispute and relations after the 
1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. In 1979, the two countries had a 27-day war, resulting in 
25,000 Chinese casualties and 20,000 Vietnamese casualties.58 The reason why the 27-
day conflict occurred was because China faced a credibility issue; as one of the major 
Communist powers, China was pressured to “show that it was not soft and helpless” 
during international disputes with weaker countries.59 The relationship between China 
and the Vietnam was consequently strained after the dispute despite both countries 
having a Communist government in power during the Cold War.60 Although the two 
countries fought each other during the short war, the territorial dispute was not resolved. 
In fact, the territorial rivalry was further exacerbated by the territorial claim disputes over 
the Paracel and Spratley Islands, in addition to claims in the Gulf of Tonkin throughout 
the 1980s.61  
 China followed the Maoist Doctrine of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence” during the later half of the Cold War.62 This is mainly “mutual respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence” after the Communist Revolution in 1949.63 After the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict Beijing leaders, such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao put a strong emphasis into 
improving China’s foreign policy, as they recognized globalization and diplomatic 
relationships were important to expanding economic growth to China- many diplomatic 
																																																								
58 Dreyer, “One Issue Leads to Another: Issue Spirals and the Sino-Vietnamese War,” 297. 
59 Hung, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” 1049. 
60 Tretiak, “China’s Vietnam War and its Consequences,” 741.  
61 Lanteine, “Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction,” 64-69. 
62 Ibid., 8.   
63 Ibid. 
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agreements involved trade and cooperation agreements.64 In essence, China became less 
partial to military force as a method of conflict resolution. 
 While some territory disputes are currently ongoing, overall relations improved 
when China and Vietnam achieved full normalization of relations in 1991 without further 
armed conflict.65 Following normalization of relations, the two states reached an 
agreement through the Land Border Treaty in 2000, creating a Joint Committee for the 
demarcation to resolve its land disputes.66 The Joint Committee eventually came to some 
solutions for China and Vietnam over a 227km2 territory.67 Overall, the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship shows both signs of improvement and degradation; while the relationship 
expanded contacts and cooperation amidst various fields, the two states failed to reach 
total territorial dispute resolution.68 
 
The Sino-Vietnamese Territory Dispute – Analysis 
 In examination of the post-Sino-Vietnamese Conflict territorial dispute, China is 
the apparently stronger state while Vietnam is the apparent weaker state. Theory 1, then, 
would suggest that China did not attack Vietnam over the territorial dispute in fear of its 
impact to Beijing’s reputation. There is evidence that supports this theory. China’s 
reputation as a Communist major power was at stake, especially when compared to the 
Soviet Union. China’s goals after the conflict were to build its international prestige and 
regional political influence.69 As a result, China focused on rapid growth in globalization 
																																																								
64 Lanteine, “Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction,” 12. 
65 Amer, “Assessing Sino- Vietnamese Relations through the Management of Contentious Issues,” 328.  
66 Ibid., 330-331. 
67 Ibid., 331. 
68 Ibid., 331-332. 
69 Tretiak, “China's Vietnam War and Its Consequences,” 740.  
	 17	
in order to rise peacefully in the international system while promoting “greater 
international harmony.”70 Additionally, while the China wanted to maintain its status as 
an international major power, it also wanted to maintain a diplomatic reputation as well. 
This is exemplified in its peaceful achievements in signing the Peace and Friendship 
Treaty with Japan, and ending its estranged relationship with the United States when 
formally recognized as the People’s Republic.71 The People’s Republic of China 
announced its support for the UN to guide international conflict resolution and eventually 
joined the United Nations in 1971.72  The PRC eventually became a “permanent five” 
member in the UNSC after taking over the Republic of China’s position.73 Given the 
growing conscientiousness of its “guoji diwei,” or international status, China was 
sensitive to its reputation as a major power. Thus, theory 1 could explain why the China 
did not attack Vietnam post Sino-Vietnamese Conflict over the territory disputes.  
 Theory 2 suggests that China did not commit its military in full against Vietnam 
due to its strategic culture. Evidence of China’s strategic culture supports this 
explanation. China’s strategic culture is defensive in nature, following both a 
Confucius/Sun Zi and a Realpolitik influence.74 This culture holds the ideas that “peace is 
precious,” to “never seek hegemony,” and to not attack if “someone doesn’t attack us.”75 
This is notable when Beijing announced its disdain for violent conflict resolution, 
supporting the United Nations as the governing entity in conflict resolution.76 In light of 
these ideas, China was not culturally programmed to use force to obtain its national 
																																																								
70 Lanteine, “Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction,” 8.   
71 Ibid., 740.  
72 Ibid., 8-9.   
73 Ibid.   
74 Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture,” 4.  
75 Ibid, 5-8.  
76 Lanteine, “Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction,” 8.   
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interests. Following the “Five Principles,” Jiang Zemin announced China’s initiative on 
improving relations with former adversaries, to include Vietnam in the 1990s.77 
Ultimately, since China did not continue using its military power to resolve the territory 
dispute, but rather preferred diplomatic methods in conflict resolution, theory 2 is feasible 
as an explanation. 
 Theory 3 would suggest China withheld military action because of Vietnam’s 
extensive alliance network. There is evidence that supports theory 3 in the context of this 
dispute. One of the largest threats to China during this era was the strong Soviet-
Vietnamese relationship.78 Vietnam aimed to diversify its foreign relations in the late 
1970s, but relied on its relationship with the Soviet Union for security and economic 
gain.79 Since the Soviet Union and China competed to be the major Communist Power, 
the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance posed a direct threat to China if Vietnam were 
challenged.  
 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1995, Vietnam then established a 
cooperative relationship with the United States.80 China raised concerns when Vietnam 
announced its membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, especially when the United 
States joined the economic alliance.81 The two countries normalized their relationship, 
and partnered on political, economic, and security matters in the Pacific region.82 The 
current day power dynamics pose the United States and China as rivaling major powers. 
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Thus, China may not have attacked Vietnam because of Vietnam’s alliance networks 
following the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict.  
 Finally, theory 4 would suggest that China did not attack Vietnam for its history 
of tenacious defense. Evidence strongly supports this theory, as Vietnam has a well-
deserved reputation in guerrilla warfare and resistance, in addition to successfully 
winning against apparently stronger aggressors. First, the Viet Minh were known to 
utilize guerrilla tactics successfully; their most significant victory was at Dien Bien Phu 
against French occupiers, contributing to Vietnam’s independence.83 Later on, North 
Vietnam and the Viet Cong successfully resisted against the United States and the South 
Vietnamese Army, eventually unifying the country under one political party.84 These two 
conflicts exemplify Vietnam’s reputation for tenacious resistance. During the Sino-
Vietnamese Conflict, Vietnam successfully resisted China’s military force, and inflicted 
more casualties to China (25,000 from China vs. 20,000 from Vietnam).85 Additionally, 
Vietnam continued to resist China’s influence in Cambodia by maintaining its own 
presence at the northern border.86 With the ongoing resistance, regardless of the scale, 
China may not have attacked Vietnam over territorial disputes because of its reputation 
and history of resistance and tenacious defense.  
 
The Beagle Conflict – Background Information 
 The Beagle Conflict took place in 1978 between Argentina and Chile, and was 
territorial in nature. Both countries claimed three islands in the mouth of the Beagle 
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Channel.87 Argentina argued that the channel curved south to the east of the islands, thus 
putting them in the Argentina side of the border.88 On the other hand, Chile argued that 
the Channel continued north of the islands, thus belonging to Chile.89 The two countries 
referred the dispute to the ICJ, where the ICJ granted Chile claim to the three islands.90 
Argentina disagreed with the ruling, and initiated a military buildup in the area in 
preparation for an invasion to claim mainland territory in addition to the three islands.91 
Under Operation Sovereignty, Argentina postured to seize the three islands in addition to 
invading and dividing continental Chile.92 However, the Vatican reached out to offer its 
assistance in mediation, to which both Argentina and Chile accepted. Ultimately, the 
Vatican served as a mediator, and successfully facilitated a peaceful agreement between 
the two countries.93 In the agreement, Chile received the three islands, but Argentina 
would receive all maritime rights in 1980.94 
 In 1978, Argentina’s foreign policy decisions were affected by the power-sharing 
and power division arrangements in its military regime.95 Not wanting to immediately 
resort to war, President Videla from Argentina attempted to negotiate with Chile through 
Argentine emissaries.96 However, with a lack of success through the attempted bilateral 
negotiations, and given the history of the dispute between Argentina and Chile, both 
states perceived a need for international support in order to resolve the dispute.97 
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Argentina then agreed to the Chile’s proposal to further arbitrate the issue through the 
ICJ.98 Argentina’s rationalization in rejecting the ICJ’s ruling was from its perception that 
the court repeatedly misunderstood Argentina’s overall argument.99 As the situation 
escalated without effective international arbitration, both countries were preparing for 
war. Argentina maintained its open preference for bilateral talks, and accepted the 
Vatican’s offer to mediate before its invasion of Chile.100  
 
The Beagle Conflict – Analysis 
 Here, the apparently stronger state is Argentina, while the apparently weaker state 
is Chile. For this dispute, theory 1 suggests that Argentina did not attack Chile in order to 
protect its international reputation. However, this does not appear to be the case. Initially, 
both Argentina and Chile mutually agreed to defer the decision of the territory dispute to 
the ICJ, yet Argentina later disagreed with the ruling. Argentina, while publically 
acknowledging the ruling to uphold international agreements, they had no intention of to 
comply with the decision since it damaged vital national interests.101 Argentina built up 
its military presence in the area, and repeatedly violated Chilean air and maritime space 
in 1977 and 1978.102 If Argentina followed through with Operation Sovereignty in 1978, 
it would hurt its reputation by becoming an unprecedented aggressor, especially after the 
international community awarded Chile the three islands. Thus, Argentina was willing to 
hurt its reputation in its invasion if not for the Vatican mediating the dispute. Thus, 
theory 1 is not supported. 
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 Theory 2 suggests that Argentina did not attack Chile because of its strategic 
culture. However, evidence does not support this theory. Argentinian strategic culture 
heavily involves nationalism and national pride; Argentina’s military nationalism would 
encourage war to achieve and protect its national interests.103 Argentinian strategic 
culture would also encourage taking what Argentina believes belongs to it.104 In his 
Puerto Montt speech, Augusto Pinochet from Chile antagonized Argentina by stating that 
“Chile had the duty to protect [the Beagle Channel] since it is theirs.”105 Consequently, if 
Argentina followed its strategic culture, President Jorge Vileda would have outright used 
force to seize the three islands after Chilean provocation and internal political pressure.106 
Clearly, theory 2 is not applicable to the Beagle Channel Conflict. 
 Theory 3 suggests that Argentina did not attack Chile because of its alliance 
network. Evidence does not support this theory. Chile’s foreign policy at the time was in 
the process of shifting due to domestic political changes. At the height of the dispute, the 
United States supported the new Chilean leader, General Pinochet, on domestic matters 
following its coup d’état.107 However, it is unclear whether the United States would 
support Chile on an international dispute, especially since the United States’ government 
was split on whether it actually supported Pinochet’s regime due to its difference in 
humanitarian values.108 Additionally, Chile did not rely on the United States to assist in 
its military affairs.109 Additionally, while the ICJ awarded Chile claim to the three 
islands, there were no official commitments from the international community to support 
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of Chile if it were attacked. Argentina knew that the international community would not 
interfere militarily; major international powers all failed to even criticize Argentina for 
disregarding the ICJ ruling.110 As a result, theory 3 does not explain this case study. 
 Theory 4 suggests that Argentina did not attack Chile because of its reputation for 
resistance. While this theory is plausible at face value, evidence does not support it. Chile 
indeed has a history of active resistance against oppressive entities. Right before the 
height of the Beagle Conflict, Chile underwent a coup d’état to overthrow the 
dictatorship.111 Throughout the 1970s, resistance forces utilized guerrilla warfare tactics 
to defy the militarized dictatorship, resulting in the eventual coup d’état and change of 
leadership; the new Chilean leadership during the Beagle Conflict was not unfamiliar to 
resisting oppressive actions.112 Given its reputation for resistance, it would be a feasible 
explanation for Argentina to avoid outright war in an attempt to evade engaging Chile in 
a long-term resistance. However, Argentina was postured and ready to execute an attack 
on Chile. The reason for Argentina recalling its invasion plans during Operation 
Sovereignty is its preference of a bilateral solution in conjunction with the Vatican’s offer 
to mediate the dispute. 
 
Cross-Straight Dispute (Taiwanese Independence) – Background Information 
 The Taiwanese independence dispute is currently ongoing, and is between the 
Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China).113 
Japan held sovereignty over the Taiwanese territory from 1895 until its defeat in World 
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War II, where Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) military forced Japan to 
surrender the colony.114 After losing to the Communist Party on mainland China, Chiang 
Kai-Shek moved the KMT, his political party, to the Taiwan island.115 The official 
transference of the territory and sovereignty of the Taiwanese colony is unclear; China 
was not a party to the Peace Treaty of September 1951, nor was any specific party 
identified to inherit the property in the other post-war treaties.116 As a result, ROC-
occupied Taiwan exercised self-determination, arguing that the PRC “never exercised 
any governmental authority over Taiwan.”117 This directly conflicts with the PRC’s “One 
China Principle.”118 Despite the sovereignty dispute, Taiwan and China maintain strong 
economic ties.119 At the present time, over 70 years into the dispute, the outbreak of war 
over the issue seems unlikely. 
 China has yet to use military force in reintegrating Taiwan to the mainland 
politically. Similar to the Sino-Vietnamese case study, China was undergoing foreign 
policy reform throughout the latter half of the 20th Century. China’s foreign policy 
focuses on globalization, diplomatic ties to other countries, and peaceful conflict 
resolution. Although China does not formally recognize Taiwan as a country, both states 
come to trade agreements with mutual benefits; both countries participate in the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement to remove numerous tariffs, and to open 
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economic ties.120 Currently, China views Taiwan as a part of its sovereign state, with a 
separate government and economy.121 
  
Cross-Straight Dispute (Taiwanese Independence) – Analysis 
 The apparently stronger state in this dispute is China (PRC) while the apparently 
weaker state is Taiwan (ROC). Theory 1 would suggest China has not attacked Taiwan to 
protect its reputation. Evidence supports this hypothesis. China is aiming to regain its 
“historical greatness” through establishing technological, economic, military, and 
political dominance.122 Since the latter half of the 20th Century, China wanted to promote 
diplomatic options for conflict resolution, especially after its acceptance into the United 
Nations.123  More recently, in order maintain political acceptance, the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) is structured to further conform to the United Nations’ norms when 
creating a diplomatic space.124 Thus, China cares about how the international community 
views the country; without international recognition of its success, China could not 
arguably regain its “historical greatness.” Consequently, China may choose not to attack 
Taiwan in order to improve its reputation. Thus, theory 1 could support this case study.  
 Theory 2 suggests that China does not attack Taiwan because of its strategic 
culture. This theory is also applicable to this dispute. Since Taiwan is not openly 
threatening China militarily, China would culturally have no reason to use military force 
against Taiwan; it would prefer maintaining peace. Additionally, under the “One China 
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Principle,” they do not even recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.125 Under this premise, 
China may not attack Taiwan because they literally view Taiwan to be a part of them. In 
other words, there is no dispute over territory nor sovereignty, since both entities are a 
single state. As a result, China may not attack Taiwan because they want to maintain 
domestic peace. Overall, theory two supports this case study.  
 Theory 3 suggests that perhaps China avoids military confrontation with Taiwan 
because of Taiwan’s alliance network. This is also a feasible explanation to the dispute. 
Taiwan’s biggest international ally is the United States; Taiwan purchases more than 75% 
of its imported weapons from the United States.126 Additionally, the United States openly 
supports Taiwan, exemplified in signing the Taiwan Relations Act and the Taiwan Allies 
International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI Act).127 This alliance could 
serve as deterrence for China to attack Taiwan, thus making theory 3 plausible.  
 Theory 4 suggests the Taiwanese history of tenacious defense deters China from 
attacking. Evidence moderately supports this theory as well. Taiwan, while not 
internationally recognized as a sovereign state, has a history of resisting occupying 
aggressors. Taiwan first resisted Japanese colonization from 1895-1945.128 The 
Taiwanese frequently practiced armed resistance against the Japanese, often through 
banditry or patriotic partisan warfare.129 Similarly, Taiwan has actively resisted China’s 
political claims over the territory since 1945, demonstrating its belief of autonomy from 
the mainland. Politically, the ROC has also been resisting the Communist Party since the 
																																																								
125 Council on Foreign Relations. 2020. China-Taiwan Relations. 
126 Ibid. 
127 S.1678 - 116Th Congress (2019-2020): Taiwan Allies International Protection And Enhancement 
Initiative (TAIPEI) Act Of 2019. 
128 Katz, "Governmentality and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan: A Case Study of the Ta-pa-ni 
Incident of 1915," 388.  
129 Ibid.  
	 27	
Chinese Civil War.130 In other words, there is literally a history between the ROC and 
PRC for resistance. In this context, in the event of an armed conflict, Taiwan would 
expect to pursue a political agenda, while China would pursue a territorial agenda. 
Therefore, China would be continuing the Civil War, from its perspective, by attacking 
Taiwan. The fear of continuing the Civil War may deter the PRC from attacking. Thus, it 
is feasible for theory 4 to apply to the Cross-Straight dispute. 
 
Conclusion  
 Of the four theories tested, theory 1 best explains why stronger states may not use 
force against a weaker state based on the analyses, with three case studies supporting the 
theory and one case study not supporting it. Theory 1 suggests that a stronger state may 
not attack a weaker state because of the perceived reputational costs to the stronger state. 
Theories 2-4 were all similar, with two case studies supporting and not supporting each 
one. As a result, theories 2-4 were considered inconclusive overall in the scope of this 
research paper.  
 Given the small sample size in this research paper, future studies with more case 
studies may further academic understanding of the topic. While theory 1 showed promise 
in this research paper, the Beagle Channel evidence did not support theory 1. Further 
study, potentially in the limitations of reputational costs, may be of interest in future 
studies. Additionally, another topic of interest that arises from this research paper is if the 
degree of power disparity between two states impacts any of the proposed theories. 
Moreover, in the Corfu Channel case study, one interesting theory that arose was whether 
a recent desire to improve diplomacy deters one state from using force.  
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